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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED
"CLOSED RECORD" ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE HEARING IN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
PROGRAM
FRANK
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INTRODUCTION

On January 12, 1983, President Reagan approved legislation l
containing several provisions designed to improve the process
whereby the Social Security Administration (SSA) conducts reviews
of disability cases for continuing medical eligibility.2 Among these
• Executive Assistant to the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals.
Social Security Administration. M.S.W., University of North Carolina, 1980; candidate
for J.D. degree, GeorgetoWD University Law Center, 1985.
This article represents the author's personal views and no official suppon or en
dorsement by the Social Security Administration or the Depanment of Health and
Human Services is intended or should be inferred.
The author is indebted to Mr. Frederick W. Amer. Professional Staff (Retired). So
cial Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Ways and Means. and Professor War
ren F. Schwartz, GeorgetoWD University Law Center. for their comments on an earlier
draft. and to Louis B. Hays, former Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals.
Social Security Administration, for his exceptional insight into many of the issues dis
cussed in the article.
1. Act of Jan. 12, 1983. Pub. L. No. 97-455, §§ 2-6. 96 Stat. 2497. 2498-2501 (codi
fied at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Act of Jan. 12).
2. Under the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-265.
94 Stat. 441, 460 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafier cited as Amend
ments of 1980), the Social Security Administration is required to review all such cases in
which the beneficiary bas a non-permanent impairment at least once every three years.
This requirement grew out of concerns in the mid-1970's that the rapid growth of the
disability program under title II of the Social Security Act was depleting the Social Se
curity Disability Trust Fund, and was fueled by reports by the Government Accounting
Office and others that large numbers of disability beneficiaries were remaining on the
rolls cven after their medical impairments had ceased or were no longer disabling. As a
result of the 1980 amendments, unprecedented numbers of continuing disability reviews
were initiated by SSA beginning in 1981 and a great many beneficiaries were informed
that they were no longer eligible for disability benefits. Newspaper accounts told of ben
eficiaries terminated because they were no longer disabled who later died of their ail
ments, and other beneficiaries who commmitted suicide upon receiving their termination
notices. Meanwhile. those who appealed their terminations were restored to the rolls in
upwards of sixty percent of the cases by the administrative law judges. although they
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was a requirement for "evidentiary hearings in reconsiderations of
disability benefit terminations" beginning "not later than January 1,
1984."3 The President noted that a new hearing will enhance the
beneficiary's opportunity to present his or her case, and will give
program officials an additional source of information about the ben
eficiary's present medical condition. 4
The House-Senate Conferees on this legislation were careful to
note that the new requirement for an evidentiary hearing at the re
consideration level in disability termination cases would not change
the requirement of existing law for a hearing before an administra
tive law judge. s But Chairman J.J. Pickle of the House Subcommit
tee on Social Security, in his remarks on the floor of the House
shortly before the Conference Report was approved by that body,
cautioned that, with over 155,000 cases "stacked up now waiting" for
administrative law judge hearings, it was imperative to consider
changes in the adjudicatory process. 6 "Next year that is one of the
were forced to endure many months without benefit payments during the lenghty appeal
period. For an account of the problems generated by these reviews, sec Oversight 0/
Social Security Disability Benefits Terminations, Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee
on OverSight 0/ Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); and CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, IM
PACT OF THE ACCELERATED REVIEW PROCESS ON CESSATIONS AND DENIALS IN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print
1982) It was in response to the public outcry over these terminations that the provisions
of Act of Jan. 12, supra note I, were enacted, their stated purpose being to ameliorate the
worst effccts of the massive review of the disability rolls undertaken pursuant to the 1980
amendments. Besides the face-ta-face reconsideration hearings, Act of Jan. 12, supra
note I, also gave disability beneficiaries who were appealing a termination of benefits the
option of continuing to receive benefit payments until the issuance of an administrative
law judge hearing decision, and authorized the Sccretary to limit the number of cases
reviewed in those state agencies that were having workload difficulties.
3. Section 44 of Act of Jan. 12, supra note I, amends section 205(b) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981).
4. President's statement on signing H.R. 7093 into law, 19 WEEKLY COMPo PRES.
Doc. 39 (Jan. 12, 1983).
5. H.R. REP. No. 285, 97th Code Cong., 2d Sess., II, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONGo &: AD. NEWS 4373, 4401. The "existing law" referred to in the Conference Report
is contained in Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act, which follows:
The Secretary [of Health and Human Services) is directed to make fiildings
of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for a payment
under this subchapter. . .. Upon request by any such individual. . . ,he shall
give such applicant . . . reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with
respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence
adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse his fiildings of fact and such
decision.
42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. V 1981).
6. 128 CONGo REc. HI0678 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982) (statement of Chairman
Pickle). As of October I, 1983, the pending administrative law judge caseload in SSA
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challenges we face," he said. 7
In addition to this backlog of pending hearing requests, Chair
man Pickle also drew his colleagues' attention to the problem of in
consistent standards of adjudication within SSA. He noted that
uniformity of standards was needed between the State agency and
admjnistrative law judge hearing levels, "so that we are judging the
cases by the same rule book. "8
Mr. Pickle's remarks on the bill enacted in early 1983 reflect
concerns expressed by his subcommittee throughout the latter half of
the 1970's.9 A 1978 study of the Social Security hearings and ap
peals process undertaken by the National Center for Administrative
Justice (CAJ)lO under contract with SSA, and at the urging of the
Pickle Subcommittee, found "three major concerns" reflected in the
relevant committee hearings and reports. These were, first, "the
backlog of cases and the corresponding inability of the current sys
tem to handle increasing numbers of appeals"; second, ''the increas
ing frequency with which [administrative law judges] reversed the
decisions of the state agencies who make initial and reconsideraton
decisions in disability cases"; and, third, ''the substantial variance in
the reversal rates of [administrative law judges]."l1
One question which naturally arises from the enactment of a
new "evidentiary hearing" requirement at the pre-administrative law
judge hearing stage is how this new procedure might help to resolve
the three longstanding problems of delay, high reversal rates, and
inconsistency among individual administrative law judges in the ex
isting Social Security appeals process. Jerry L. Mashaw (who
headed the CAJ study group), suggests in his recent book, Bureaubad increased to 173,431 cases. SSA, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Operational Re
port (Sept. 30, 1983) (SSA Pub. No. 70-032 (1-84» [hereinafter cited as OHA OPERA
TIONAL REPORT, FY 1983). The average time between the tiling of a request for a
hearing and the issuance of a hearing decision was in excess of 180 days. SSA, OFFICE
OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS (Dec. 1983) (mimeo) [herein
after cited as KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS).
7. 128 CONGo REc. HI0678 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982) (statement of Chairman
Pickle).

8. Id.
See, e.g., Delays in Social Security Appeals: Hearings Before tlte Subcommillee on
Social Security oftlte Committee on Ways omJ Means 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [herein
after cited as Delays in Social Security Appeals: 1975 Hearings); STAFF OF THE SUB
9.

COMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, May
17, 1976 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE isSUE PAPER, 1976).
10. J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ & P. VERKUIL, SOCIAL
SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA
TION HEARING SYSTEM (1978) [hereinafter cited as CAl STUDY REPORT).
II. Id. at 1-3.
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erotic Justice, 12 that a number of improvements might be expected to
flow from an informal, face-to-face hearing at the reconsideration
level. He noted, first, that claimants would be more satisfied when
allowed to present their appeals personally, and that the immediacy
of the face-to-face encounter with a decisionmaker would increase
the perceived fairness of the process. Second, the decisionmaker
would also benefit from the additional information gleaned directly
from the claimant. This need not require a loss of appropriate objec
tivity, Mashaw noted, but would simply add a human dimension to
what had been a mere claims folder review. As a result, Mashaw
anticipated that the reconsideration decision would be strengthened
and hence "more likely to stand up on appeal."13
Interestingly, the first House bill to contain a face-to-face hear
ing requirement for the reconsideration level would have also re
quired that the evidentiary record be closed to the admission of new
evidence at the subsequent levels of the appeals process. 14 This
would mean, then, that the administrative law judge hearing and re
sulting decision would be limited in scope to the record as it was
developed below, in any case in which a dissatisfied claimant, fol
lowing the lower-level hearing, appealed the reconsideration deci
sion to the next level. This "closed record" requirement was not,
however, included in the legislation signed by the President in early
1983.
It would seem worthwhile not only to examine the three
problems cited by the CAl six years ago in light of current workload
trends, but also to consider, first, the likely effects of the new lower
level hearing on the overall disability appeals process, and, second,
how the "closed record" concept, originally linked to the require
ment for a lower-level hearing, might further contribute to this
improvement.
The CAl, in its final study report, suggested that the results of
the study might help ''to refine prior appreciation of the trade-offs
involved in pursuing any particular goal," such as the timeliness or
consistency of decision-making. "Criticism of the present system,"
the authors pointed out, "often focuses on one of its failings, such as
the backlog of cases, with no apparent understanding that (some rad
12. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL
ITY CLAIMS (1983) [hereinafter cited as MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE].

13. Id at 199.
14. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, DISABILITY AMENDMENTS OF 1982,
H.R. REP. No. 588, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (to accompany H.R. 6181) [hereinafter
cited as DISABILITY AMENDMENTS].
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ical breakthrough in technology aside) material improvement in this
regard can only be achieved by paying a price-either more re
sources for handling these cases or a lesser accomplishment of other
relevant ends, such as the accuracy, consistency, and perceived fair
ness of the system."IS The authors' major conclusion was that any
"new procedure that serves one or more of the ends of the system
yielding faster and more accurate decisions-and disserves none of
its other ends-as for example, entailing no loss of perceived fairness
by claimants and requiring no additional outlays-is as rare as it is
desirable." 16
This observation suggests the need for a cautious approach to
analysis of problems and solutions in an adjudicatory system of such
magnitude and complexity. Any proposal or-in the case of the new
reconsideration hearings-actual change in law designed to improve
the SSA hearings and appeals process, must be considered in the
context of the overall system. As the CAJ observed, there is "no
doubt that the interrelationships among the many functions that
comprise this system are so subtle and complex that facile general
ization about what will happen to everything else if one feature is
changed is impossible."I'

II. A

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS
AND APPEALS PROCESS

In fiscal year 1983,18 ninety-seven percent of the administrative
law judge hearing requests processed by SSA's Office of Hearings
and Appeals (OHA) arose in disability cases under titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act. 19 It is therefore customary for profes
sional staff at OHA as well as congressional and other outside stu
15. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 6.
16. Id at 11-12.
17. Id at xix-xx.
18. The federal fiscal year runs from October I through September 30. Thus, fiscal
year 1983 consists of the period of October I, 1982 through September 30, 1983.
19. OHA OPERATIONAL REPORT, FY 1983, supra note 6. Title II of the Social
Security Act is the basic insurance program which includes, inte,. alia, Retirement and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance. Title XVI is the Supplemental Security
(SSI) program for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, a needs-based program. The disability
requirements under titles II and XVI are identical. Thus, a title II claim initially requires
a determination of insured status whereas a title XVI claim requires a determination of
whether the claimant's income and resources are within statutory limits, but once these
threshold determinations are resolved in favor of the claimant, the substantive medical
vocational determination of disability is essentially the same for both types of claims.
Special rules, not relevant here, apply to disabled children and disabled surviving
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dents of the process to equate the administrative law judge hearing
process with the disability appeals process. This paper follows that
general custom.
The adjudication of a claim for disability benefits begins with
the filing of an application by the claimant at a local Social Security
office. The medical-vocational aspects of the initial determination
are made in most cases by a State Disability Determination Services
agency.20 If the claimant is dissatisfied with the results of the state
agency's initial determination, he or she may request reconsidera
tion. 2t Prior to the enactment of the new requirement for a face-to
face hearing at the reconsideration level in disability termination
cases, the reconsideration process "consist[ed] solely of a review of
documentary evidence in the case file by [the state agency's] physi
cians and staff; the claimant or beneficiary who appeal[ed] an initial
determination [did] not actually meet with a decisionmaker until the
[administrative law judge] hearing level."22
At the administrative law judge hearing level, the claimant's
case is reviewed and the evidence brought up to date, and the claim
ant is given an opportunity for a hearing before an administrative
law judge appointed under the Administrative Procedure Act. 23 If
20. The rules governing the relationship of these state agencies with SSA may be
found at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 Q (1983) (title II cases); and id. pI. 416 J (for title XVI cases).
21. The rules governing requests for administrative review-including reconsider
ation, administrative law judge hearings and Appeals Council review-may be found at
20 C.F.R. pI. 404 J (for title II cases); and iti. pI. 416 N (for title XVI cases). The recon
sideration process, it should be noted, was created by regulation, not by the Social Secur
ity Act itself. For an account of its origins and an analysis of the legal issues
surrrounding its creation, see Horsk.y and Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security
Administration Hearing and Decisional Machinery 401-02 (1960) (mimeo) (hereinafter
cited as Horsk.y Report).
22. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Disability Termination Hearings at the Re
consideration Level, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,831 (1983).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). The core Social Security Act provisions regarding "no
tice and opportunity for a hearing" actually pre-dated by more than 10 years the Admin
istrative Procedure Act, but as Robert G. Dixon, Jr. and others have pointed out, section
205(b) of the Social Security Act is regarded as requiring an APA-appointed administra
tive law judge to conduct the hearings required by that section. See R.G. DIXON, SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY AND MAss JUSTICE: A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION 146
(1973).
An interesting legal issue is whether SSA hearings are required to conform to the
APA requirements, even assuming that the presiding officials must be APA-appointed
administrative law judges. In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), the Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to "decide whether the APA has general application to social
security disability claims, for the social security administrative procedure does not vary
from that prescribed by the APA. Indeed, the latter is modeled upon the Social Security
Act." Id, at 409. However, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Margaret M.
Heckler, in the preamble to the Department's regulations governing the Equal Access to
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the claimant is still dissatisfied after receiving the administrative law
judge's decision, he or she can request review by the Appeals Coun
cil, SSA's highest administrative adjudicatory body. Finally, the
claimant who is dissatisfied with the Appeals Council's decision can
file a civil action in a United States district court under section
205(g) of the Social Security Act. 24
Perhaps the most important statistical trend in disability adjudi
cation under the Social Security Act is the almost steady increase
since the mid-1960's of the proportion of claims allowed at the ad
ministrative law judge hearing level as compared with the two state
agency levels. The chart below, prepared by SSA's Office of Disabil
ity, shows this trend for title II cases since 1965. This trend was cited
repeatedly in legislative documents in the mid-1970's, when congres
sional concern over actuarial deficits in the disability trust fund was
especially strong. 2S

Justice Act (the EAJA), has stated that "adjudications of claims under the Social Security
programs arc not covered [by the EAJA) because ... they are not 'required to be under .5
u.s.c. .5.54' as required by § 13.3 [of the Secretary's EAJA regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 13.3
(1983»." 48 Fed. Reg. 45,251 (1983) (emphasis added).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981). There has been discussion over a number
of years about the possibility of eliminating district court jurisdiction over Social Security
cases and instead establishing a spccializcd Article I Social Security Court. For an inter
esting debate over both the proposal and the underlying problems with the judicial re
view process, see Ogilvy, The Social Security Court Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. LEGIS. 229
(1982); and Amer, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer to a Critique 10 J.
LEGIS. 324 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Delays in Social Security Appeals: 197.5 Hearings, supra note 9. In a
backgound paper prepared by the Social Security Subcommittee staff, that report stated:
The present "crisis" in the social security appeals process is linked to the tre
mendous backlog of disability hearings and the resultant delay that benefi
ciaries encounter in going through the process of exhausting their
administrative remedies. . . .
Equally important as speed of processing of cases, is the question of the quality
of adjudication. The rate of rnersal of initial denials of disability has become so
substantial in recent years that ithos been citedby the Administration as one 0/the
reasons/or the growing actuarial dejicit in the disabUity insurance system.
Jd, at 8 (emphasis in original). See also LEGISLATIVE isSUE PAPER, supra note 9: "Over
the years, the number of cases reversed on appeal has been increasing and the Social
Security Administration has stated that reversals on appeal are playing a growing role in
the actuarial deficiency in the disability insurance program."
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III. SSA's EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARING
SYSTEM: ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ITS WEAKNESSES
A.

The Systems Accomplishments

The administrative law judge hearing component of SSA "is
probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world."26 In
fiscal year 1983, more than 360,000 requests for hearings before ad
ministrative law judges were received by OHA.27 The disability pro
grams administered by SSA, the Supreme Court has noted, "are of a
size and extent difficult to comprehend."28 At the present time, more
than two-thirds of the nearly 1200 administrative law judges in the
federal government are employed by SSA. 29
The brief for the government in Heckler Y. Day, 30 a case involv
ing court-imposed time limits on the Social Security administrative
law judge hearing process, which was recently argued before the
Supreme Court, describes the strides made by SSA in meeting its
extraordinary administrative law judge hearing workloads over the
past decade. Total hearing requests grew from 72,000 in fiscal year
1973 to more than 320,000 in fiscal year 1982. During this time pe
riod, SSA increased the size of its administrative law judge corps
from 420 to nearly 800, while more than doubling the number of
support staff who assist the administrative law judges in the 130 local
hearing offices nationwide. These and other initiatives allowed SSA
to absorb a more than fourfold increase in its caseload without sub
stantially increasing the average processing time of cases from the
1973 level of 174 days.31
If the administrative efficiency achieved by SSA's administra
tive law judge hearing process is an important attribute of success in
an adjudicatory system of this magnitude, so, too, is the perceived
fairness of the appeals process among claimants and their represent
26. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at xi.
27. KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6.
28. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
29. See Skoler, The Clumging Role of Administrorive Low Judges: Time to Shfft
Gears, 22 JUDGE'S J. 24, 27 (1983). Skoler's article includes a chart which illustrates the

dramatic growth of the SSA administrative law judge corps and its eventual domination
of the federal administrative law judge corps. In 1947, of the 196 administrative law
judges government-wide, only thirteen, or 6.6 percent, were employed by SSA. By 1974,
more than half of the 792 federal administrative law judges were employed by SSA. In
January 1979,660 out of 1070 administrative law judges, or 61.7 percent, were employed
by SSA. In January 1983, 812 out ofa total of 1176 federal administrative law judges, or
69.1 percent, were in the SSA administrative law judge corps. Id.
30. No. 81-1983 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 1983).
31. Brief for the Petitioner at 6-8, Heckler v. Do)'.
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atives. "The headline," according to the CAl study, "is that claim
ants generally perceive their hearings to be fair and adequate."32
That report concludes that the administrative law judge hearing pro
cess as it is presently administered in SSA is a useful means of mak
ing the disability decisionmaking process "more acceptable" to
claimants and beneficiaries who appeal adverse determinations. 33
Edwin Yourman, writing in 1975, acknowledged that the administra
tive law judges employed by SSA were "able, conscientious and ef
fective" in carrying out their statutory responsibilities. 34
These favorable, recent assessments of the effectiveness of SSA's
administrative law judge hearing process appear to confirm that it
has largely succeeded in accomplishing the mission set out for the
hearing process by the original Social Security Board under Arthur
J. Altmeyer in 1940, more than 15 years before the disability provi
sions were added to the Social Security Act. In a report authored by
Ralph F. Fuchs, the Board stated its expectation that the "value of
the hearing process" in the original Old-Age and Survivors insur
ance program would arise, first, from the claimant's ability in such a
process "to state his contentions openly," and, second, from the abil
ity of the hearing official to arrive at an independent judgment on
the merits of the claim which had been denied at the lower level. 3S
In his recent book on the overall SSA disability adjudication
system, Mashaw concludes that the administrative law judge hearing
process has allowed SSA to incorporate the advantages of individu
alized attention to claimants while still efficiently processing ex
tremely large numbers of claims at the initial and reconsideration
levels. 36 It is the administrative law judge hearing process, according
to Mashaw, that has successfully fulfilled an essential humanizing
32. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
33. Id at 28.
34. Yourman, Report on Beneficiary Hearings, Appeals and Judicial Review 55
(1975) (mimeo).
35. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, BASIC PROVISIONS
ADoPTED BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD FOR THE HEARING AND REVIEW OF OLD
AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE CLAIMS, WITH A DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN ADMINIS
TRATIVE PROBLEMS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 (1940) [hereinafter cited as the
FUCHS REPORT). The Fuchs Report also gives an account of the "referees" the Board
envisioned who would conduct the hearings, which interestingly docs not appear to differ
significantly from today's administrative law judges: ''The desirability of a high type of
personnel in the referees' positions is apparent. . . . Legal training and experience will
be very valuable if not indispensible. Above all, the ability to inspire confidence, which
is a product of personality and broad experience, is a prerequisite to successful function
ing." Id at 41.
36. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTIcE, supra note 12, at 214.
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function in the process of adjucating disability claims within SSA.37
It has done so despite remarkable increases in workloads and com
plex program changes that could not have been foreseen by its de
pression-era founders.

B. The System's Weaknesses.
1.

The Problem of Delay

Undoubtedly, the most widely discussed problem in the Social
Security administrative law judge hearing process is the problem of
delay. Countless hours of congressional committee time have been
taken up with this question. 38 So, too, has the time of the courts,39 in
a series of class actions in which Social Security and SSI claimants
have successfully obtained court-ordered time limits on the process
ing of appeals,40 and, in many of these cases, the payment of interim
benefits to claimants whose appeals are not decided in accordance
with the time limits.41
37. Mashaw postulates several "process values" to which any successful system of
adjudication must attend, even if its decisions are always accurate. These include:
"equality," "transparency," "participation," and "humaneness". Id at 88-97. Having
served for many years as the first level where the claimant can meet face-to-face with a
decisionmaker, the administrative law judge hearing process has clearly played a signifi
cant role in actualizing some of these "process values." For example, Mashaw stresses
the importance of the "transparency" of the decisionmaking process. He notes that
Franz Kafka, whose novel, TIre Trial, spawned a new word ("kafkaesque") to describe
non-transparent, alienating decisional processes, "gained many of his impressions of ad
ministrative processes as a bureaucrat in an agency dispensing disability benefits." Id at
91 n.9 (referring to F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (3d ed. 1956». The statutory guarantee of
"reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing" provided to Social Security claimants
in the form of an administrative law judge hearing has contributed immeasurably to the
"transparency" of the decisionmaking process, writes Mashaw, especially in disability
cases which by their nature involve sensitive, personal determinations about the effects of
various medical impairments on the claimant's ability to work, and in which, before the
recent introduction of the reconsideration-level hearing, there was no face-ta-face contact
in the early stages of the decisionmaking process. Id. at 90-92.
38. See, e.g. , J)elays in Social Security Appeals: 1975 Hearings, supra note 9.
39. Most recently, the Unites States Supreme Court took up the issue in the case of
Heckler v. Day, No. 81-1938 (argued Dec. 5, 1983).
40. See Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978); Wright v.
Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1978);
Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978); and White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). See also, Note, Judicial Resolution of Sys
temic J)elays in Social Security Hearings, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1979).
41. One of the cases in which payment of interim benefits was part of the relief
ordered by the court is Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19,21 (2d Cu. 1982), cert granted sub
nom. Heckler v. Day, 103 S.Ct. 1873 (1983) (No. 81-1983). The issue was briefed by the
parties in the Supreme Court and will presumably be addressed in the Court's forthcom
ing decision.
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As the government's brief in Day implicitly concedes, delay at
the administrative law judge hearing level within SSA has been an
intractable problem fOr over a decade. 42 The claimant who today
requests an administrative law judge hearing will wait an average of
about 185 days for the issuance of a hearing decision. 43 At the close
of fiscal year 1983, nearly one-fifth of SSA's pending administrative
law judge hearing cases were undecided after 180 days.44 Over 5,500
cases had been pending for over 365 days.4s
In Day, the lower courts found that processing times in excess of
180 days constituted a violation of the statutory requirement for a
"reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing."46 The gist of the
government's argument before the Supreme Court in Day was that,
in the absence of any findings of "bad faith or dilatory motive on the
part of HHS,"47 the existing processing times "are such an en
trenched feature-and direct and foreseeable consequence--of the
conscientious implementation of the Social Security Act by Congress
and the Secretary . . . that the normal processing period . . . is by
definition 'reasonable' within the meaning of the statute."48 Still, the
fact remains that average processing times in excess of six months in
an administrative hearing process are extremely long, especially in
light of the possibly destitute or near-destitute circumstances of
many disability claimants.
In a July 1974 report, the staff of the Committee on Ways and
Means commented on this "appeals crisis" as follows:
There is a substantial question as to whether the multitiered Social
Security appeals procedure can withstand the current workloads
under Social Security and SSI . . . .
A Harrison Subcommittee admonition in 1960 seems still per
tinent today. It stated, in answer to the Department's assertion
that the many reviews and re-reviews of decisions were necessary
to assure uniformity in the operation of a nationwide program,
that the "question of whether a claimant becomes exhausted in the
process of exhausting his administrative remedies is always a real
one."49
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6.
Id
Id
42 U.S.c. § 405(b) (1981).
Brief for the Petitioner at 38, Heclcler II. Do)'.
Id at 33.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,

93d CONG., 1ST SESS., RE
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2. The Problem of Variations in Allowance Rates Among
Administrative Law Judges
Both the CAJ50 and the late Professor Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,51 in
their respective analyses of the Social Security administrative law
judge hearing process, remarked that its greatest weakness is the in
consistency of results among individual administrative law judges.
Both studies noted that administrative law judge production statis
tics revealed extreme disparities among the administrative law
judges in their reversal rates, not only nationally but also on a re
gional basis and even in particular hearing offices. 52 Dixon termed
this variation "striking and disturbing"53 in his analysis of 1971 data.
Fiscal year 1983 data, as shown in the chart below, continue to show
a large degree of inter-judge variance in allowance rates. 54 Thus, at
the same time that "SSA has been able to absorb the more than four
fold increase in its hearing caseload," as the government boasted in
the Day brief,55 it has not succeeded in appreciably reducing the dis
parity in case outcomes among the administrative law judges. 56
"One of the commonest definitions of an arbitrary adjudicatory
system," Mashaw observes, "is one in which the person who decides
a particular controversy is more important than the merits of the
case."57 Moreover, according the CAJ study report, "[t]he evidence
is persuasive that the inteIjudge dispersion in reversal rates is truly a
product of subjective factors, probably relating primarily to the in
terpretative role of the administrative law judge rather than the in-

PORT ON THE DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM 5 (Comm. Print 1974) (berinafter cited
CoMMITTEE STAFF REPORT).
50. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 42.
51. See, e.g., Delays in Social SecurilyAppeal.r: 1975 Hearings,supra note 9, at 117
(statement of Professor Dixon).
52. R.O. DIXON, supra note 23, at 76. The term "allowance rate" is probably more
appropriate than the term "reversal rate," since an administrative law judge on an open
record does not so much reverse the lower level decision as he or she docs allow the claim
based on his or her own de novo review of the casco
53. Id at 76-77.
54. SSA, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Division of Systems and Statistics (1984)
(mimeo).
55. Su supra note 31 and accompanying text.
56. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 42.
57. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 73.
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vestigative one."S8 That report concludes that "a claimant's success
at the appeal stage is substantially affected by the identity of the pre
siding [administrative law judge)." Thus, the wide variation in al
lowance rates among SSA's administrative law judges, as Dixon
emphasized, "raises questions of equal dispensation of justice."s9
3.

The Problem of Error-Prone Allowances

"[I]t seems a priori," according to the CAl study report, "that
objection to the mark.ed inteIjudge variance in reversal rates is more
soundly based" than objection to "the frequency of [administrative
law judge] reversal of state agency determinations," which "raises
consistency issues that are at best problematic."60 Nevertheless, the
current administrative law judge allowance rate, which is in excess of
fifty-five percent, "not only fails to inspire confidence in the system,"
as Dixon wrote at a time when the allowance rate was less than fifty
percent, "but encourages more requests for hearings because odds
are so good."61 In its 1974 Report on the Disability Insurance Pro
gram, the staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means wrote:
Commentators on the program have pointed out that perserver
anee in pushing an appeal may be the most important ingredient
in success in the borderline cases and that Supreme Court Justice
Blackmun's statement in the Perales case that a 44.2-percent hear
ing examiner reversal rate attests to "the fairness of the system"
does not fully reftect the unevenness that exists in the system. 62

Congressional concern over the high rate of allowances at the
administrative law judge hearing level, coupled with the lack. of
meaningful agency review of allowance decisions,63 culminated in
an amendment to the Social Security Disability Amendments of
1980, introduced by then-Senator Henry Bellmon on the floor of the
58. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.
59. R.G. DIXON, supra note 23, at 79.
60. CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.
61. R.G. DIXON, supra note 23, at 40
62. 1974 COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 5.
63. The Social Security Subcommittee had criticized SSA for several years prior to
enactment of the Bellmon Amendment because of SSA's failure to review administrative
law judge allowance decisions. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, 1976 supra note 9,
at 31; DisahUity Insurance Program: Public Hearings Before tire House Suhcom. on Social
Security of tire Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976); /)isahi/ity
Insurance Legislation: Hearings Before tire House Suhcomm. on Social Security of the
Comm. on Ways and Means on Proposals to Improve the DisahUity Insurance Program,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 223-24 (1979) (statement of Chairman Pickle).
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Senate. 64 In a 1982 report on the initial phase of the review,6S the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) noted that the
amendment arose out of congressional concerns over the high-and
growing- rate of allowances by administrative law judges.66
The initial Bellmon report compared the Appeals Council's
views on cases decided by administrative law judges with high, me
dium and low allowance rates. 67 The report found that the Appeals
Council agreed with the allowance decisions of the medium and low
allowance groups more than two-thirds of the time, but that the Ap
peals Council agreed with the allowance decisions of the high-allow
ance administrative law judges in only fifty-two percent of the cases.
The report concluded that, taking the Appeals Council decision as
"correct," it was clear that the most error-prone decisions were the
allowance decisions of high-allowing administrative law judges.68
Accordingly, HHS reported that an ongoing program of own-motion
review under the Bellmon amendment was initiated on October I,
1981, and that the focus of that review would be on administrative
64. Act of Jan. 12, supra note I, § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 42 1(h) (West 1983».
65. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, iMPLEMENTATION OF SEC
TION 304(G) OF PuBLIC LAW 96-265, "SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AMENDMENTS OF
1980": REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1982) [hereinafter cited as BELLMON REPORT).
''This report was prepared in response to the congressional requirement to initiate a re
view of disability decisions at the hearing level and to report on that review." Id at 1.
66. Id
67. The report divided the three groups as follows:

AU

AU

Allowance Rate Group

Allowance
Percentage

Median
Allowance Rate

Low Allowance Rate
Medium Allowance Rate
High Allowance Rate

0-55%
56-70%
71-100%

47%
63%
77%

AU

Id at 21.
6S. Id at 23. These findings are consistent with those of a 1980 article by Deborah
A. Chassman and Howard Rolston, former OHA employees who developed and oper
ated the agency's first quality assurance system. See Chassman & Rolston, Social Secur
ity Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL
L. REV. SOl (l9S0). In their article, Chassman and Rolston noted that:
Simple statistical tests reveal that the error rate for sample cases of [administra
tive law judges) with extremely high or extremely low allowance rates is higher
than for other cases. This is particularly true for the allowance decisions of
[administrative law judges) with high allowance rates. This suggests that in
some instances the outcome of a claimant's case depends on the luck of the
draw rather than the merits of the claim. Appeals CoW/cO review ofsucll cases
would enhance tile fundamental fairness of tile system precisely wllere il lias
deteriorated
Id at SI8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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law judge allowance decisions. 69 The review is conducted by the
Appeals Council under its longstanding authority to review any ad
ministrative law judge decision on its own motion. 70
Data generated by this ongoing own-motion review by the Ap
peals Council suggest not only that high-allowance administrative
law judges as a group are more error-prone than their peers, but also
that allowance decisions themselves are more error-prone than de
nial decisions at the administrative law judge hearing level. This
conclusion is reached by comparing the rate at which the Appeals
Council exercises its own-motion review authority in cases where the
administrative law judge has allowed benefits with the rate at which
the Council grants review at the request of claimants who have re
ceived unfavorable administrative law judge decisions. 71 During
fiscal year 1983, own-motion review was taken in over seventeen per
cent of the cases considered by the Council under the Bellmon
amendment,72 as compared with a grant-review rate of only 8.6 per
cent in cases where claimants appealed unfavorable administrative
law judge decisions. 73 These data confirm the impression long held
69. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 23. The focus of the ongoing Bellmon
review on the decisions of administrative law judges with high allowance rates was chal
lenged by administrative law judges as an infringement of their decisional independence
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Association of Administrative Law Judges in
the Department of Health and Human Services, Inc. v. Schweiker, No. 83-124 (D. D.C.
filed Jan. 19, 1983) (Judge Joyce Hens Grccn presiding). Judge Grccn's decision was
pending as this article went to press.
70. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 30.
71. The regulatory criteria governing Appeals Council determinations as to
whether or not to review an administrative law judge decision are identical for own
motion review and claimant-initiated review. See Cases the Appeals Council Will Re
view, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970,416.1470 (1983). Thus, assuming the Council applies these
criteria impartially, it is appropriate to compare oWD-motion rates for allowance deci
sions with grant-review rates for denial decisions to arrive at an approximation of the
relative error-proneness of the two types of decisions. It is important to note that, when
the Appeals Council either grants a claimant's request for review or reviews a case on its
own motion, that action alone docs not constitute a reversal of the administrative law
judge's decision. For example, in fiscal year 1983, the Council vacated the administrative
law judge's decision and remanded in nearly 5,000 cases and reversed the administrative
law judges in approximately 4,500 other cases. OHA OPERATIONAL REPORT, FY 1983,
supra note 6.
72. SSA, Office of Hearings and AppcaIs. Office of Appraisal: Report on Quality
Review, FY 83 Update (1984).
73. KEy WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6. Even if one assumes some partial
ity on the part of the Appeals Council towards finding fault with allowance decisions
during this time, perhaps in reaction to the Bellmon Amendment's implicit criticism of
the Council's failure to exercise its own-motion authority for a number of years prior to
the 1980 amendments, the difference betwccn the oWD-motion and grant-review rates
appears to be too great to be attributed entirely to such a bias.
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by the state agencies and others that administrative law judges as a
group tend to err on the side of allowances. 74
IV.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE "OPEN FILE" CONCEPT TO THE
PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
HEARING PROCESS

At the suggestion of Congress, SSA's report on the initial imple
mentation of the Bellmon review considered the effect of additional
evidence submitted at the administrative law judge hearing level. In
this portion of the study, a group of administrative law judges was
asked to review the same 1,000 cases that had previously been re
viewed by another group of administrative law judges, except that
the cases in the second review were stripped of any evidence which
had been submitted after the reconsideration level. The study found
that the administrative law judges who reviewed the cases without
the added evidence would have allowed almost fifty percent fewer
cases than were allowed by the administrative law judges who had
reviewed the same cases with the additional evidence. In the great
majority of the cases, the additional evidence related to a medical
condition that had been alleged by the claimant and considered by
the decisionmaker at the lower level, not to a new or worsened con
dition. The study concluded that "additional evidence submitted af
ter the [state agency] reconsideration decision ... made a significant
difference in [administrative law judge] allowance rates."7S
74. ''The system encourages (the administrative law judges) to be Robin Hoods
and give away the king's deer." MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 73
(quoting STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., DISA
BILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER 35 (1976».
75. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 27. The Report explains this phase of the
study as follows:
The third phase of the initial review was designed to determine the effect on
(administrative law judge) decisions of additional evidence submitted after the
(state agency) reconsideration decision. . . . Each case was revised to remove
any evidence added after the (state agency) reconsideration decision. The case
folders, stripped of all information gathered in the hearings process, were dis
tributed to another representative group of 48 (administrative law judges) for a
complete readjudication. . . . The differences in decisions on these 1,000
cases-adjudicated both with (in the second phase of the study) and without (in
the third phase) post-reconsideration evidence-should be, in the aggregate, at
tributable to the submission of additional evidence after the reconsideration
level.
... (A)dditional evidence made a significant difference in (administrative law
judge) allowance rates. The overall second phase allowance rate of 46 percent
dropped to 31 percent when all additional evidence was removed. . . .

Id.
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This portion of the Bellmon study clearly suggests that new evi
dence about pre-existing medical conditions has a profound impact
on administrative law judge allowance rates. Moreover, the CAl
study in 1978 found "great variation in [individual administrative
law judge] development effort."76 Taken together, the results of both
studies indicate, first, that individual idiosyncrasies among adminis
trative law judges with regard to the development of new evidence is
an important factor in the wide variation in their individual allow
ance rates, and, second, that the admission by administrative law
judges of new evidence not available at the state agency levels is a
major cause of the high overall administrative law judge allowance
rate.
The link between the open file concept and the three problems
of delay, discrepancies in outcome, and high allowance rates at the
administrative law judge hearing level, then, is rather clear. First,
the admission of new evidence by administrative law judges,
whether because of their own development efforts or because of sub
mittal by claimants and their representatives, appears to be responsi
ble for a great many of the administrative law judge reversals of
lower level. denials. Except where the new evidence pertains to a
new or worsening condition, which the Bellmon report suggests is
not all that common, the allowance of a claim by an administrative
law judge on the basis of new evidence would presumably be unnec
essary had the lower-:-Ievel decisionmaker had the opportunity to
consider that same evidence. By raising the odds of an allowance on
appeal, the open file in tum encourages appeals and contributes to
the problem of backlogs and delays in the appeals process. Finally,
different approaches by individual administrative law judges to the
task of case development at their level appear to be responsible for a
fairly substantial amount of the variation in individual administra
tive law judge allowance rates.
V.

A.

THE "CLOSED RECORD" ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE HEARING

Origins of the Concept

On Friday, September 19, 1975, the Subcommittee on Social Se
curity held one of a series of hearings on the subject of "delays in
Social Security appeals." During that hearing, Representative
Archer of Texas asked a panel of expert witnesses whether, if they
76.

CAJ STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at 52.
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were "starting from scratch," they would design the disability ap
peals process in its present form, or whether a different approach
might yield more just and equitable results, not just for claimants but
for contributors to the trust fund as well. 77
One month later, in the same series of hearings, Mr. Archer sug
gested an answer to his earlier question in a question he asked then
SSA Commissioner Cardwell regarding the Commissioner's opinion
about a suggestion "to close the record" at some point in the process.
"Some people from Texas said this would get rid of a big, big share
of the problem," said Mr. Archer.78 "In a way," responded Commis
sioner Cardwell, "the answer we would give to your question if we
were starting from scratch dovetails with that very question."79
Cardwell acknowledged that the existing "open record arrangement"
produced marked inconsistencies from level to level within the ap
peals process, and that ''these judgments are going in every
direction."SO
Representative Conable joined the colloquy at this point, and it
continued as follows:
Hyou are going to close the record, you will have
to be careful about what gets into the record.
The reason you keep the record open is to protect
a process that is not all that carefully constructed,
really.
Mr. Cardwell: I agree. I think it puts an added burden on the
thoroughness and efficiency of the basic adjudica
tion of claims, and this would have to be
examined.
Mr. Archer:
But you cannot expect the decision at the lower
level to be in conformity with the decisions as
you go up the ladder of appeals, if you are deal
ing with different facts.
Mr. Conable:

77. Delays in Social Security Appeals: 197.5 Hearings, supra note 9, at 155. Unfor
tunately, the record shows that a recess was called just after Mr. Archer asked his ques
tion, before the panel could respond. After the recess, Representative Steiger said, "We
were anxiously awaiting the answer to Bill Archer's thought-provoking questions." Id.
The responses, however, went off on the issue of federal versus state disability determina
tion units rather than the basic: structure of the appeals process which seems to have been
at the root of Mr. Archer's question. See ill.
78. Id at 531.
79. Id
80. Id
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Mr. Cardwell: That is right. The facts keep changing in the

Mr. Archer:

present system, and very often you have an initial
determination at what appears to be the final
hearing process, because that hearing officer will
be hearing facts that no one else has had an
opportunity to consider.
If the initial decision is not based on all of the
facts, then there is something lacking.
We should not have any decisions not based on
all of the available facts, and it just seems to me
this may be the key to solving a lot of the prob
lem.
If the initial process does not bring into focus all
of the facts, then we are not doing our job under
the law because there are a lot of people who do
not appeal, who are being subjected to a decision,
where all of the facts are not present.
We want to do justice to all ofthe people covered
by these laws. But once there is an opportunityfor
all of the facts to come in, it seems to me a very
strong argument could be made that the record
ought to be closed at some point, so you do not
have to continue to embellish and add to this rec
ord. As long as you do, it seems to me no mailer
what other steps we take, we will have this tremen
dous d!lference between the decisions that are ren
dered at a higher level, and the decisions rendered
at a lower level 81

B.

'Closed Record" Legislation
In the 1980 Amendments, Congress took an initial step in the

direction advocated by Mr. Archer by amending the Social Security
Act to provide that an application for benefits is valid only if the
claimant "satisfies the requirements for such benefits" as of the date
of the adminjstrative law judge hearing decision, at the latest. 82 AI
81. Id at 531-32. (emphasis added).
82. Social Security Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 306,94 Stat.
441,457 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 405 (1976 &; Supp. V 1981». Paragraph (2) now
reads:
An application for any monthly benefits under this section filed before the first
month in which the applicant satisfies the requirements for such benefits shall
be deemed a valid application (and shall be deemed to have been filed in such
first month) only if the applicant satisfies the requirements for such benefits
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most three years later, SSA published proposed regulations to imple
ment that provision. The preamble to the proposed regulations
explained that Congress, in enacting the provision, had given the
Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to limit the
Appeals Council's review of administrative law judge decisions to
the evidence that had been considered by the administrative law
judge. 83
On May 26, 1982, the House Ways and Means Committee ap
proved a bill which took even more decisive action to curtail the
open file concept in Social Security disability claims adjudication.
The bill, entitled "Disability Amendments of 1982," was intended,
among other things, "to strengthen the reconsideration process by
providing for the earlier introduction of evidence, [and] to provide
for more uniformity in decisionmaking at all levels of adjudica
tion."84 The Committee Report described the existing disability ap
peals process, in which "cases have been able to be taken up 'de
novo' at each administrative level," and noted that the 1980 amend
ments had taken a "first step. . . to reform this process by 'closing
the record' at the [administrative law judge] level." Citing its con
cern over "the deliberate withholding" of "available evidence from
treating physicians and specialists consulted independently by claim
ants" until they reached the administrative law judge hearing level,85
the Committee approved a two-part reform particularly aimed at im
proving the reconsideration level of the appeals process. The bill
provided, first, for a face-to-face hearing at the reconsideration level
(much like the procedure later established by P.L. 97-455), and, sec
ond, a "modified closed record requirement"86 under which new evi
dence of a previously alleged impairment would not be admissible at
the administrative law judge hearing level, but would instead be re
manded to the reconsideration level. 87
before the Secretary makes a final decision on the application and no request
under section 205(b) for notice and opportunity for a hearing thereon is made
or, if such a request is made, before a decision based upon the evidence ad
duced at the hearing is made (regardless of whether such decision becomes the
final decision of the Secretary).
83. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,968 (1983). As of the date of this writing, final regulations to
implement this provision have not been issued.
84. DISABILITY AMENDMENTS, supra note 14, at 1.
85. Id at 11.
86. Id
87. Id at 12. The bill "modified" a more stringent closed-record requirement
which had been introduced by Representatives Pickle and Archer in H.R. 5700. Section
5 of that bill would have provided simply that "[n)o documentary evidence submitted on
or after the date of a decision on reconsideration . . . shall be considered in connection
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"The amendment," the Committee explained, "was purposely
designed to get attorneys and other representatives to proffer rele
vant and available material which is essential to a decision on the
best evidence at reconsideration."88 A dozen members of the Com
mittee, however, took issue with the approach adopted by the Com
mittee majority. In their "Separate Views," published with the
Committee's report on the bill, these members wrote:
Making the reconsideration level a more meaningful step in the
disability determination process is a sound goal. To the extent
that cases are resolved at this stage, the system will be improved.
Closing the record at this stage, however, as Section 5 would do, is
an unfair and inefficient means of improving the process at the
State level. The whole purpose of the hearing by an Administra
tive Law Judge is to provide an independent check and balance to
executive discretion under the law. If the hearing before the Ad
ministrative Law Judge is to have an)' meaning at all, the individ
ual's (sic] appealing the State agency decision must be aI/owed to
present all of their evidence. 89

As it turned out, the 97th Congress did not act on the Ways and
Means Committee bill. Instead, in response to a growing public out
cry over the number ofterminations resulting from the 1980 Amend
ments, Congress enacted the provisions of P.L. 97-455, reqtiliing
reconsideration hearings and permitting benefit continuation
through the administrative law judge hearing level in disability ter
mination cases. The major reforms, as Mr. Pickle said, were left for
"next year." Neither the full Ways and Means Committee nor the
Social Security Subcommittee has since then resurrected the discus
sion of whether the face-to-face reconsideration hearing should be
the last de novo stage in the Social Security appeals process, thereby
making the administrative law judge hearing a "closed record"
proceeding.9O
with entitlement to benefits. . . ." Id. Besides adding the requirement that the closed
record would apply only when the claimant had had an opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing at the reconsideration level, the bill approved by the full Ways and Means Com
mittee also permitted the administrative law judge to admit "evidence of new and wors
ening conditions." Id. Further, the Committee's bill also included "[a] specific provision
. . . requiring both written and oral notice to the claimant that it was essential to get
available evidence into the record at reconsideration and that the individual might wish
to obtain an attorney or other representative." It/.
88. It/.
89. It/. at 82. (emphasis added).
90. In late 1983, the Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill entitled "So
cial Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1983." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
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THE NEED FOR A "CLOSED RECORD" FOLLOWING THE
LOWER-LEVEL EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Several observations can be made about the relationship of the
various statistical trends and problems in the Social Security disabil
ity appeals process. It is clear, first of all, that as the proportion of
allowances which occurs at the administrative law judge level has
mushroomed from less than five percent in the mid-1960's to roughly
one-third in the early 1980's, so, too, has the number of appeals and
the resulting problem of case backlogs and delays. It is also clear
that the open file concept plays an important, if indeterminate, role
in the large number of allowances which occur on appeal. Finally,
the decisionmaking process as it is presently structured appears to
tend towards erroneous denials (or "false negative" decisions) at the
lower level (due to lack of complete development) but towards erro
neous allowances (or "false positive" decisions) at the administrative
law judge hearing level.
Reforms are obviously needed which will, first, allow the disaMEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP.. No. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(hereinafter TAX REFORM ACT OF 1983). The Committee Report noted:
The disability insurance program has attracted substantial Congressional atten
tion over the last two years, primarily because of the numbers of beneficiaries
whose benefits have been terminated. The review of current beneficiaries that
has produced these terminations was mandated by Congress, but was acceler
ated in pace in March, 1981. There has been no suggestion that those receiving
disability benefits should never be examined again, but the committee believes
that the process over the last several years has resulted in erroneous termination
of benefits for at least some people. . . . The overall purpose of the bill is, first,
to clarify statutory guidelines for the determination process to insure that no
beneficiary loses eligibility for benefits as a result of careless or arbitrary deci
sion-making by the Federal government. Second, the bill is intended to provide
a more humane and understandable application and appeal process for disabil
ity applicants and beneficiaries appealing termination of their benefits. Finally,
the bill seeks to standardize the Social Security Administration's policy-making
procedures through the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative
Procedures [sic] Act, and to make those procedures conform with the standard
practices of Federal law, through acquiescence in Federal Court of Appeals
rulings.
Id at 410. The major provision of the bill with regard to the structure of the decision
making process was to eliminate the reconsideration level as it is now known and require
face-ta-face hearings in the state agencies at the initial determination stage in benefit
termination cases. The bill also required SSA ''to initiate demonstration projects with
respect to face-to-face evidentiary meetings at the initial level of state agency determina
tions for new applicants. . . ." Id at 423. The bill was silent on the issue of closing the
record following the first face-ta-face hearing stage. On March 27, 1984, the House of
Representatives passed the bill by the extraordinary vote of 410 to 1. 130 CONO. REC.
HI956-93. The Senate had not yet acted on any comparable legislation as this article
went to press.
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bility adjudication process to do a better job of distinguishing eligi
ble from ineligible claims at the early decisional stages, and, second,
make it less likely to have the lower-level determination reversed on
appeal. To the extent that face-to-face contact will help bring about
the first of these improvements, the new reconsideration level hear
ings should greatly reduce the incidence of "false negatives" in state
agency decisions in the termination cases in which the new proce
dure will be available. 91 The latter improvement, however, is un
likely under the existing open file system, notwithstanding any
improvements in the lower-level decisionmaking process. 92
"Very few reforms will improve all dimensions of the process at
once," cautioned the CAl study report. "Every change requires a
trade-off among relevant values."93 The change to a more personal
ized lower level determination, as a result of the new face-to-face
reconsideration process, itself represents a compromise between a
concern over the fairness and quality of the lower-level decisions
and the need for speedy and economical adjudication of vast num
bers of cases. In enacting P.L. 97-455, Congress has clearly deter
mined that, at least with respect to termination cases, it is worth the
time, expense, and administrative difficulty involved in providing in
dividualized hearings, to require such a procedure at an early stage
of the process.
The change from the present open file system to an appeals pro
91. In a congressional hearing in June 1983, a Social Security Administration offi
cial reported that, in a pilot test of the new face-to-face reconsideration procedure, the
reconsideration allowance rate was thirty-eight percent. Social Security Disability Insur
ance: Hearing Before tile SulJcommittee on Social Security of tile Committee on Ways and
Means. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st Scss_ 69 (1983). The statement was
made by then-Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals Louis B. Hays in re
sponse to a question from Subcommittee Chairman Pickle. This is in stark contrast to
the usual reconsideration allowance rate of twenty percent or less by the state agencies.
KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS, supra note 6. These data confirm Mashaw's expectation
that, in response to a face-to-face encounter with a claimant, ''the number of claims
granted by state agencies should go up." MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note
12, at 199.
92. It is far from certain, for example, that a lower proportion of administrative
law judge allowances will occur in the cases which are not favorably reconsidered as a
result of the face-to-face hearing. The danger implicit in the somewhat experimental use
of an evidentiary hearing process at the reconsideration level in termination cases is that
it will simply result in a greater overall number of allowances. It is conceivable, in other
words, that the greater latitude given the state agency hearing officer under the new pro
cess (as compared with the lesser discretion given the normal state agency claims exam
iner under the old process) will result in a higher reconsideration allowance rate but that
administrative law judges will continue to allow roughly sixty percent of the cases they
receive.
93. CAl STUDY REPORT, supra note 10, at xix.
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cess with a more restricted right to submit new evidence to an ad
ministrative law judge, as the 1982 Ways and Means Committee bill
required, would likewise involve a trade-off. In this instance, the
trade-off would be a reduction in inter- as well as intra-stage incon
sistency in case outcomes, resulting in a speedier and less congested
appeals process, as against a lesser opportunity for the claimant to
prove his or her case on appeal, which could erode the perceived
fairness of the process.
The 1982 Ways and Means bill struck what appears to have
been a reasonable balance among these various considerations by
]jnking the reconsideration hearing with a closed record requirement
for the subsequent levels of the appeals process. The trade-off in the
bill was that, in return for a much-improved opportunity to present
one's case at the reconsideration level, any further appeals would
have to be taken solely on the basis of the case record as it was per
fected at the lower level. Experience would suggest that, by severing
the reconsideration hearing from the closed record requirement, as it
did in P.L. 97-455, Congress has set the stage for an actuarial ''worst
case" scenario: an increased tendency towards allowances at the
lower level with no corresponding decrease in allowances by the ad
ministrative law judges. Thus, if, as many commentators would sug
gest, SSA extends the face-to-face reconsideration hearing to non
termination cases, the disability trust fund deficiencies of the mid
1970's might well return to haunt both SSA and the Congress in the
mid-1980's.
VII.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A "CLOSED RECORD"
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARING

Perhaps the strongest argument against a closed record adminis
trative law judge hearing is that on its face it seems contradictory to
speak of an evidentiary hearing at which the decisionmaker is fore
closed from admitting new evidence which is apparently relevant in
deciding the case. In his Administrative Law Treatise, 94 Professor
Davis analyzes the development of the law with regard to adminis
trative hearing processes, but nowhere does the question of a closed
record hearing arise. At both a theoretical and a practical level, the
idea of such a hearing seems anamolous. What would be left to dis
cuss at such a hearing? Recalling that the question at issue would be
the ability of the claimant to work in spite of his or her medical
impairments, would any purpose even be served by the claimant's
94.

K.C.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

(1918).
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attendance, assuming that the administrative law judge could not go
beyond the evidentiary record developed below? Or would it suffice
for the claimant's counsel to submit written arguments and make a
brief oral argument? In short, would not the administrative law
judge hearing quickly become anachronistic and merely repetitive of
the paper-review type of process which now occurs at the Appeals
Council level?
These questions suggest the potential complexity underlying
any proposal to "close the record." Obviously, there are many possi
ble gradations between a de novo hearing on a completely open rec
ord, and a totally closed-record hearing where, in effect, only legal
issues would be open for discussion. The 1982 Ways and Means
Committee bill explicitly exempted from the closed record require
ment evidence pertaining to new or worsening medical impairments.
Other exemptions, such as evidence deduced by careful questioning
of the claimant as to his or her daily habits, were arguably implicit in
that legislation. The target of the bill appears to have been documen
tary evidence which was, or could have been, available at the recon
sideration level which is either consciously or unconsciously
withheld by the claimant until the administrative law judge hearing.
Although the exact extent of this phenomenon is unknown, the Sec
retary's Bellmon report indicates that, whatever its extent, the intro
duction of new documentary evidence at the administrative law
judge hearing level does have a profound impact on case outcomes. 95
An integral aspect of the closed record requirement in the 1982
legislation was an apparently liberal remand authority, whereby the
administrative law judges could direct that an imperfectly developed
record be more thoroughly worked up by the state staff.96 Presuma
bly, in any case remanded by the administrative law judge the state
would have to provide an opportunity for further face-to-face hear
ing before returning the case to the administrative law judge for de
cision. (Cases favorably disposed of by the state agency on remand
might, of course, simply be processed for payment without going
back up to the administrative law judge.) Perhaps to prevent abuse,
the state agencies could be authorized to ask for Appeals Council
review of remand orders they believe to be unnecessary or excessive.
But a liberal remand authority would appear to be necessary to pre
95. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
96. According to the Committee Report. the bill required that "if the claimant
wished [this newly offered) material to be part of the record•... the case be remanded to
the reconsideration level. ..." H.R. REp. No. 588. 97th Congo 2d Sess. 12 (1982).
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serve the fairness of the system. Thus, a case could be returned by
the administrative law judge to the state agency for further develop
ment or an additional reconsideration-level hearing, not only when
the administrative law judge perceives a deficiency in the record as it
was developed below but also when the claimant asks to admit new
evidence into the record at the administrative law judge hearing.
It should be emphasized that a closed record would not fore
close the administrative law judge from making an independent
judgment on the facts of the case. He or she would not, in other
words, be limited to reversing only those lower level decisions which
were not supported by substantial evidence, as are the federal district
courts under section 20S(g) of the Social Security Act. 97 Thus, the
claimant's in-person appearance and credibility would retain much
of their present importance in the administrative law judge hearing
and decisionmaking process. It would be a mistake, therefore, to as
sume that the restrictions imposed by a closed record on the claim
ant's ability to submit new evidence to the administrative law judie
would deprive the administrative law judge hearing process of its
vitality and significance in the eyes of claimants and their
representatives.
Finally, it would appear that, from an administrative stand
point, the closed record could shift a considerable workload from the
administrative law judges and their staffs to the state agencies, since
there would no longer be a need for extensive case development at
the administrative law judge hearing level. This would presumably
help to offset some of the large administrative costs likely to be re
quired to provide individualized hearings at the reconsideration
level.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Ways and Means Committee members who submitted sep
arate views on the closed record provision ofH.R. 6181 in 1982 sug
gested that "some mistakes and omissions are going to be made at
the State level," due in part to the fact that few claimants have repre
sentation at that level and in part to simple error by "[o]verworked
and underfinanced State agencies." "By allowing the record to re
main open to additional evidence through the [administrative law
judge] hearing," they concluded, "tragic mistakes can be avoided."98
The problem with the closed record requirement, they believed, was
97. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981).
98. Id at 81.
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that it would cure the problems in the system by making it more
difficult for beneficiaries to contest a termination of benefits. "Re
stricting the right to appeal the decision made by the State agency"
they reasoned, "is not the way to improve the system at the State
level."99
In the wake of the justifiable public concern over the large
number of apparently erroneous disability benefit terminations
under the 1980 amendments, it is difficult to take issue with a cau
tious or even skeptical view of the ability of the state agencies to
produce accurate, fair, replicable decisions on the disability claims
sent to them by SSA for either a first-time decision or a later review.
On this score, the dissenters on the Ways and Means Committee in
1982 would appear to be today's majority. But the underlying
problems with the disability appeals process, as exemplified by the
problems of delay, variance and the tendency towards erroneous al
lowances at the administrative law judge hearing level, remain, and
require serious corrective action on the part of Congress.
Although not wholly free from doubt as to its workability and
fairness, the idea of a closed record administrative law judge hearing
after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing at the reconsideration
level clearly has the potential for improving the consistency and
replicability of decisionmaking not only at the administrative law
judge hearing level but also in the state agencies. Once the reconsid
eration-level hearing process is fully operational and has any "bugs"
worked out (conservatively, that might be at the end of calendar year
1984), it would be reasonable to implement the closed record system
on a trial basis. 1oo To do so would be entirely consistent with the
pledge made by the original Social Security Board that a continual
effort be made to "preserve an attitude of self-criticism" and to im
prove the SSA hearing process on the basis of operational
99. Id at 82.
100. The closed record provisions of H.R. 6181 were limited to benefit termination
cases, in which the reconsideration-level hearing would have been (and, under Pub. L.
No. 97-455, is) required. "This provision in the bill will provide a real test as to the
effectiveness and fairness of a face-ta-face reconsideration and the closing of the record,
and if it proves successful it could, over time, be extended to the reconsideration process
of initial claims," according to the Committee Report. H .R. REp. No. 588, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1982). Arguably, termination cases are not an appropriate place to begin
testing the effectiveness and fairness of the closed record administrative law judge hear
ing, since a beneficiary who faces termination of benefits is likely to be particularly trau
matized by that prospect and may require more, not less, consideration than a person
applying for benefits for the first time. A more appropriate approach might be to extend
the face-ta-face hearing requirement to new application cases and then test the closed
record in those cases before using it in termination cases.
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